The U.S. Supreme Court has recently ruled on exercising jurisdiction over companies owned by a foreign state.
Ordinarily, courts require that a foreign defendant has “minimum contacts” with the forum state that would justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923 (2011) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) provides that foreign states and their instrumentalities are immune from suit in United States courts unless there is a statutory exception to immunity that is enumerated in the FSIA. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. Among exceptions abrogating immunity there are claims based on commercial activities in or with a sufficient nexus to the United States, claims based on torts that lead to personal injury or property damage in the United States, and claims to confirm arbitral awards. When an exception applies, the FSIA confers federal courts original jurisdiction (i.e. subject matter jurisdiction) over such claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a).
However, the United States Supreme Court recently held that a defendant that is owned by a foreign state need not have minimum contacts with the forum so long as the requirements of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act are met. Particularly, on June 5, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion in CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd., addressing a key procedural issue in enforcing arbitral awards against foreign states and their entities. Justice Alito, writing for the Court, held that when the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) applies, federal courts are not required to conduct a separate minimum contacts analysis under the Due Process Clause to assert personal jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign.
The case involved a contractual dispute between a private company named Devas, and a commercial organization owned by the Republic of India, called Antrix. Devas received an arbitration award against Antrix, and then sought to enforce the award in a Washington federal court. The district court ruled that Antrix could be subject to suit under the arbitration exception and entered judgment against Antrix. Conversely, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Antrix. The personal jurisdiction clause in the FSIA provides that “personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist” if (1) there is a statutory exception to immunity; and (2) the defendant was properly served. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b). Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit held that “personal jurisdiction under the FSIA [also] requires a traditional minimum contacts analysis,” and Antrix lacked sufficient minimum contacts with the forum to justify personal jurisdiction over it.
The Supreme Court considered that personal jurisdiction over a defendant who is a foreign sovereign is “automatic” when there is an immunity exception and the defendant has been served, and “subject matter jurisdiction plus service of process equals personal jurisdiction”. Furthermore, according to the FSIA, “Congress did not require ‘minimum contacts’ over and above the contacts already required by the Act’s enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity”.